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I. INTRODUCTION

This comment focuses on how an independent search-and-seizure standard,
now being re-created by the Wyoming Supreme Court under the state's constitution, should treat traffic detentions.' Traffic detentions encompass the span of
time after the traveler halts the vehicle, when the officer inspects the driver's credentials and writes the citation.2 The brief stop forms a significant nexus between
people's lives and law enforcement, providing opportunity for the officer to view
the driver, look at the interior of the vehicle, examine the passengers and ask questions about the driver's business.3 During these routine activities, the officer may
come to believe that the driver or the vehicle is involved in a crime-frequently
*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2007. The author received his Master of
Fine Arts in creative writing from the University of Oregon. He also earned a degree
in English from the University of Montana and a degree in Art from Eastern Montana
College.
'Vasquez v. State, 990 P2d 476, 485 (Wyo. 1999) (stating that Article 1, Section 4 of the
Wyoming Constitution "deserves and requires the development of sound principles upon
which to decide the search and seizure issues arising from state law enforcement").
2 Lindsay v. State, 108 P.3d 852, 857 (Wyo. 2005).
3 See

4 WAYNE R. LAFAvE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 9.3 (4th ed. 2004) ("[Tlhe renewed interest in traffic enforcement is attributable to a
federally-sponsored initiative related to the 'war on drugs."').
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the transportation of contraband.4 Police often use these observations to develop
probable cause to investigate matters that lie outside of the limited scope of traffic
violations, leading to detention of the driver or a search of the vehicle.5
Since the early 1960s, the Fourth Amendment has governed traffic detentions in Wyoming, and the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that protections
provided under the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment were the
same. 6 But in 1999, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized in Vasquez v. State
its duty to create an independent search-and-seizure standard under the Wyoming
Constitution, stating that sound principles should be developed under the state
constitution for deciding search-and-seizure issues. 7 According to the court, The
Wyoming Constitution "is a unique document, the supreme law of [the] state, and
this is sufficient reason to decide that it should be at issue whenever an individual
believes a constitutionally guaranteed right has been violated." 8 The new standard
"may provide greater protection [of citizen's rights] . . .; or may provide less, in
which case the federal law would prevail . ..."
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision to create an independent standard
arose out of its dissatisfaction with how the Fourth Amendment was being applied
to traffic stops.1l The court noted that a significant amount of traffic traverses
Wyoming on its way to other areas of the country, and accompanying that traffic
is a considerable amount of drugs.1" As a result, federal drug interdiction efforts
4See

id.

IO'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 419 (Wyo. 2005) (expressing dissatisfaction over the
aggressive tactics of law enforcement seeking to search vehicles).
' Vasquez, 990 p.2d at 483-84 ("This practice was essentially required in order to comply
with the [United States] Supreme Court's expansive protection provided to individual
rights during the 1960s and 1970s ....
Id. at 485. The court stated,
Just as we have done with other state constitutional provisions which
have no federal counterpart, we think that Article 1, Section 4 deserves
and requires the development of sound principles upon which to
decide the search and seizure issues arising from state law enforcement
action despite its federal counterpart and the activity it generates for
the United States Supreme Court.
Id.
8

Id.

9Id. See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 612 (Wyo. 1993) (noting that the United States
Supreme Court permits states to provide more protections than those offered federally, at
the state's legislative or judicial discretion). In Vasquez, the court declared that Article 1,
Section 4 is separate from the Fourth Amendment and "requires an independent interpretation regardless of its similarities to or differences from the Federal Constitution."
Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 486.
l0See O'Boyle v. State, 117 P3d 401, 411 (Wyo. 2005).
1 Id.
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have targeted the state's highways.1 2 Consequently, state citizens traveling upon
Wyoming highways have been imposed upon by aggressive investigatory techniques, disapproved of by the Wyoming Supreme Court, but allowed under the
Fourth Amendment.1 3 An independent standard relieves the Wyoming Supreme
Court from the burden of following the federal standard, giving the court some
control over how it treats the state's citizens. 1 But employing an independent
standard requires turning away from the well-established body of case law related
to traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment. 5 This federal case law provides
officers at traffic stops specific guidance regarding what actions are reasonable and
what actions are not, and it strives to balance the rights of citizens against legitimate governmental interests, including investigation and prevention of crime.16
In O'Boyle v. State-the one opportunity the Wyoming Supreme Court has
had to address traffic detention under the Wyoming Constitution-the court
7
failed to achieve the clarity and balance existent under the Fourth Amendment.

12

Id.

13 Id.
14

See id. at 422. (Voigt, J., concurring). While agreeing with the majority decision to cre-

ate an independent search-and-seizure standard, Justice Voigt criticized how federal courts
have regulated traffic detentions under the federal standard. Id. He called the practice of
routinely turning traffic stops into drug investigations "intellectually dishonest." Id. Also,
he stated that courts have applied the standard inconsistently, and rather than trying to
stretch the federal traffic-detention rule to include drug control efforts, he stated that a
rule should be devised which identifies "what investigative steps directed at drug interdiction" during a traffic detention "are constitutionally reasonable." Id.
15 See 4 LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 9.3, for an analysis of the Fourth Amendment trafficdetention doctrine.
'6 See id.
17O'Boyle

v. State, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005). The Wyoming Supreme Court has decided
other cases under Article 1, Section 4 that included traffic stops, but they focused on issues
other than traffic detention. See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo., 1999) andJohnson
v. State, 137 P3d 903 (Wyo. 2006). Vasquez concerned a search subsequent to an arrest.
990 P2d at 478. The facts provided no information about the stop and provided no basis
for a traffic-detention analysis. See id. at 479. Johnson was an inventory search. 137 P3d
at 909. The case provided an analysis of the stop, but the analysis mixed state and federal
authorities and made no effort to distinguish state law. Id. at 906 (citing cases decided
under the state constitution, O'Boyle and Vasquez, in the same analysis as Campbell v.
State, 97 P.3d 781 (Wyo. 2004), which relied upon federal law). In Johnson, the Wyoming
Supreme Court made no attempt to create a standard independent from federal law
because the court held that the federal and state standards for inventory searches are
identical. Johnson, 137 P.3d at 908-09. The recently decided case Fertig v. State held that
a traffic stop initiated by an officer who witnesses a traffic violation is reasonable under
Article 1, Section 4, even when the stop was made as a pretext for other investigation.
Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, 28. Although the reason for and execution of the stop is
likely to impact how the court perceives the traffic detention, how the stop was conducted
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The traffic-detention holding in O'Boyle gave no guidance to officers, and it failed
to explain what factors the court found relevant when evaluating an officer's reasonableness, leaving no basis for predicting the court's future actions." As a consequence, the state's current traffic-detention rule fails to meet basic governmental
needs, making Wyoming's rule a mere pale cousin to its federal counterpart.' 9
A traffic detention rule that fails to address basic governmental needs is
inconsistent with the history of Article 1, Section 4, which may be distinct from
the Fourth Amendment, but arises from the same sources in England and early
America.20 In the first part of the last century, a significant amount of contraband
liquor traversed the state's highways during the Prohibition Era. 2 Under the
Wyoming Constitution, the court regulated law enforcement's efforts to control
this traffic, while extending guidance to officers and proper explanation of factors
relevant to the court's reasoning.22 Therefore, a traffic-detention rule that provides
specific guidance to officers and legitimizes the need to investigate criminal activity is not only desirable, but consistent with the Wyoming Constitution and its
23
history.
A Wyoming traffic-detention rule scrupulously based on Wyoming law
would also address a separate, but related issue-the federal requirement that
state constitutional rulings be based upon "adequate state ground. '24 The United
States Supreme Court held that it has the power to review decisions by state courts
that intermix state and federal constitutional doctrines, or that fail to provide an
adequate state rationale for a constitutional decision. 25 A close look at O'Boyle
reveals that the Wyoming Supreme Court explained the unreasonableness of some
of the officer's actions by drawing upon federal concepts that have no officially

is a separate issue from the traffic detention, as Fertig, itself, acknowledged. Id. 1 23
("Significantly, however, in O'Boyle, the focus of our constitutional analysis involved an
evaluation of police conduct after the stop. We did not question an officer's authority to
initiate a traffic stop after an observed traffic violation . .
18 See infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
19See4 LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 9.1 (a) (observing that the practice of stopping and frisking
suspicious persons is a "time-honored police procedure," and police have long recognized
it as a distinct procedure from other police procedures such as arrest, or search incident
to arrest).
20 See State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342, 344-45 (Wyo. 1920) (noting that provisions against
unreasonable search and seizure are "one of the fundamental props of English and
American liberty").
21 See State v. Young, 281 P. 17 (Wyo. 1929).
22 See idat 19-20 (adopting holdings from other states that provide examples of reasonable
officer conduct at traffic stops). See also infra notes 103-37 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 103-37 and accompanying text.
24 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983).
25
d. at 1040-41.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3
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recognized basis in Wyoming law.26 This not only illustrates the insufficiency of
the state's current traffic-detention doctrine-which appears incapable of providing an adequate rationale for the court's decision-it intermixes state and federal
27
ideas in a manner which is inconsistent with the dictates of Michigan v. Long.
A sufficient traffic-detention doctrine based upon Wyoming law would meet the
standard advanced by the United States Supreme Court in Long and ensure that
decisions made under the Wyoming Constitution are consistent with Wyoming's
legal history.28
In summary, the Wyoming Supreme Court articulated in O'Boyle under the
Wyoming Constitution a traffic-detention rule that fails to recognize legitimate
governmental interests, and the rule is so insufficiently grounded in state law
that it cannot be understood without drawing upon Fourth Amendment concepts. However, the history of search-and-seizure in Wyoming provides ample
basis for a doctrine that is adequately grounded in state law and sufficient to
address governmental interests. This comment, first, describes how Wyoming's
current search-and-seizure doctrine evolved historically. Next, it examines federal
and state law to determine the framework that the Wyoming Supreme Court
must operate within if it is to have a doctrine that is truly independent from the
United States Constitution. Third, this comment provides a rationale for creating
an independent search-and-seizure doctrine, using six factors identified by the
Wyoming Supreme Court as relevant in a state constitutional argument. Finally,
this analysis recommends a traffic-detention standard based upon the case law
and constitutional history of Wyoming.
II. BACKGROUND

A. How We Got Here
In 1889, the delegates to the Wyoming Constitutional Convention gathered
in Cheyenne and drafted the Wyoming Constitution in twenty-five days.29
Fittingly, one of the reasons for this flurry of activity was dissatisfaction over how
the Wyoming territory was being managed by federal authorities, and a perception
by key persons of the desirability for the territory to become independent from the

26

27

28

See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
See Long, 463 U.S. at 1042.
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 623 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J. concurring) ("Only by

the customary process of research and reasoning can there be principled development of a
body of state constitutional law that does not seek merely to sidestep review by the United
States Supreme Court in isolated cases but one that truly supports the state constitution,
as
state court judges and lawyers are charged to do.").
29
ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE
GUIDE 1 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Greenwood Press, Reference Guides to the State Constitutions
of the United States No. 7) (1993).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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federal government under a state constitution.30 For the purposes of this discussion
of search and seizure at traffic stops, the convention succeeded---creating a consti3
tution that stood apart from the Fourth Amendment and operated on its own. '
The Wyoming Constitution had to operate independently because in that era the
federal constitution had no power over state and local authorities.32 Therefore, once
the state constitution was approved by Congress, a sheriff was subject to Article 1,
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, but not the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 33 If the sheriff unreasonably searched a traveler, he
answered not to the United States Supreme Court in Washington, D.C., but to
the Wyoming Supreme Court in Cheyenne.34 Therefore, the Wyoming Supreme
Court was part of a two-tiered system for protecting citizens' rights: The actions
of federal authorities were regulated by the United States Constitution, and the
Wyoming Supreme Court was the sole protector of citizens' rights from violations
by state authorities.35 Consequently, for the next seventy years Wyoming courts
considered the reasoning of federal courts regarding the Fourth Amendment
persuasive, but not controlling, and the highest law for state officials was the
36
Wyoming Constitution.
This changed in 1961 when the United States Supreme Court decided
Mapp v. Ohio.37 Mapp incorporated the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment, requiring states to offer search-and-seizure protections that were at
least equivalent to those that regulated federal authorities.38 After the passage of
Mapp, the Wyoming Supreme Court's search-and-seizure standard was no longer
independent, and decisions could be reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.3 9 Like most state courts, the Wyoming Supreme Court's reaction to Mapp
was to interpret search-and-seizure issues using the Fourth Amendment, meaning
the Wyoming Constitution no longer acted as the primary protector of citizens'
rights.4 ° But the Wyoming Supreme Court continued to refer to the state constitu-

30

Id. at 1.
"' State v. Peterson 194 P. 342, 350 (Wyo. 1920). ("As to the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, it has been held to operate solely on the federal government, its courts and officers, and not as a limitation upon the powers of the states.").
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id.
17 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
38 Vasquez v. State, 990 P2d 476, 483-84 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643,654-55 (1961)). For an explanation of the rationales underlying Mapp and the effect
that Mapp had on the application of state search-and-seizure law in Wyoming and other
states, see infra notes 85-93.
39 Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 483-84. See also infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
40 Vasquez, 990 P2d at 483-84. See also infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3
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tion in its search-and-seizure analyses, causing an intermixing of state and federal
search-and-seizure authorities.4 ' Through the 1960s, state courts across the nation
found the pre-eminence of the United States Constitution satisfactory because
2
the progressive Warren Court was aggressively protecting citizens' rights.1
After the Warren Court, however, United States Supreme Court began to lessen
protections extended to defendants, and state courts across the nation resumed
their role in the two-tiered system of state and federal protections that existed
prior to Mapp.43 State courts could offer equal or greater protections than the
United States Constitution, but if they offered less, then the Federal Constitution
applied.44 In 1999, the Wyoming Supreme Court announced that it, too, would
resume its role as the provider of an independent standard of search-and-seizure
protections." 5

41 See Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 62 (Wyo. 1982). Jessee relied upon a federal doctrine

expounded in Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), while stating that the doctrine was consistent with holdings in the Wyoming case State v. George, 231 P. 683 (Wyo.
1924).Jessee, 640 P.2d at 62.
42 Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 485 ("But now, in the aftermath of the Warren Court's criminal
procedure rulings, the Wyoming Supreme Court appears to follow federal precedent
and typically treats this provision as offering no greater protection than does the Fourth
Amendment."). See also Justice Walter J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protections
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 490-95 nn.2-36 and accompanying text
(1977) (describing how federal protections expanded during the 1960s under the United
States Constitution).
13 See Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming ConstitutionalInterpretation, 21 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 525, 528 (1986). According to the author, following the "Burger Court's
retreat from the activist posture assumed by the Warren Court [during the 1960s] in
the area of individual rights," lawyers nationwide discovered that state courts provided
protections unavailable under the Federal Constitution. Id. Justice William J. Brennan, in
a seminal law-review article, urged state courts to "step into the breach" and use their own
constitutions to replace rights no longer being protected under the Federal Constitution:
With the federal locus of our double protections weakened, our liberties
cannot survive if the states betray the trust the [United States Supreme]
Court has put in them. And if that trust is, for the Court, strong enough
to override the risk that some states may not live up to it, how much
more strongly should we trust state courts whose manifest purpose is to
expand constitutional protections. With federal scrutiny diminished,
state courts must respond by increasing their own [scrutiny].
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977).
" O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
654 (1961)).
45 Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 485 (Wyo. 1999).
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The intermingling of state and federal authorities by state courts across the
nation following Mapp complicated the United States Supreme Court's task of
supervising the Federal Constitution.4 6 Although the Court serves as the protector of the United States Constitution, the Tenth Amendment prohibits it from
interpreting state constitutional law.47 As a result of the commingling, the United
States Supreme Court occasionally had difficulty determining whether a searchand-seizure decision by a state court was grounded upon the federal or state
constitution.48 A series of tests evolved for determining when decisions were based
upon federal law; however, the Court became dissatisfied with these because they
could not be applied consistently.49 In 1983, the Court responded with Michigan
v. Long, which created the standard that the Wyoming Supreme Court must meet
if it is to have a search-and-seizure rule which is invulnerable to federal review,
and therefore, truly independent.5 0

B. EstablishingIndependent State Ground
The approach used in Wyoming to distinguish protections offered under the
Wyoming Constitution from those provided federally starts with the premise that
the Wyoming Constitution is an independent source of citizens' rights that operates in parallel to the United States Constitution.5 1 The seminal explanation of the
Wyoming approach was provided by Justice Golden in his concurrence to Saldana

46 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1983).

Saldana v. State, 846 P2d 604, 612 (Wyo. 1993).
48 Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-39.
17

49 See id. at 1039.
50 Id. at 1039-40. The dictates of Michigan v. Long have been handled inconsistently by

both state courts and the United States Supreme Court. See Ken Gormley, The Silver
Anniversary of New Judicial Federalism, 66 ALB. L. REv. 797, 801-05 (2003) (noting that
over-technical decisions by the United States Supreme Court have caused unnecessary
review of state decisions and frustrated state courts) and Patricia Fahlbusch & Daniel
Gonzalez, Case Comment, Michigan v. Long: The Inadequacies of Independent and
Adequate State Ground, 42 U. MIt~i L. REv. 159 (1987) (exploring the variety of ways
that state courts have responded to Long). Michigan v. Long included an escape provision
that allowed state courts to avoid review by including a plain statement indicating that the
decision was based on state, not federal, law. 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). As long as the
plain statement was present, the United States Supreme Court said it would refrain from
reviewing the decision under the United States Constitution. Id. Consequently, some
state courts have relied upon use of a plain statement to prevent review while continuing
to intermix state and federal constitutional doctrine. State v. Gunwall, 720 P2d 808, 81112 (Wyo. 1986) (noting that relying upon a statement that a decision rests on state law
rather than providing an explanation of the underlying rationale for the decision provides
no "rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law").
51See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622-24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring). For a
comparison of the text of Article 1, Section 4 and the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes
196-99 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3
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v. State.5 2 He stated that an appellant seeking to have an issue considered under
the Wyoming Constitution "must do more than ask, he must show" that the
argument presented deserves consideration under the state constitution." Justice
Golden explained that the court will refuse to consider arguments under the state
constitution unless they are accompanied by sufficient analysis and authority.54
Lacking that, the Wyoming Supreme Court will decide the issue under federal
constitutional law. 51 Justice Golden noted six "non-exclusive neutral factors" the
court finds relevant when weighing which constitution, the state or the federal,
offers greater protections: "(1) the textual language [of the constitutional provision]; (2) the differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting
state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local
56
concern."
Justice Golden drew this approach from the Washington case State v.
Gunwall.57 The Washington Supreme Court in Gunwall stated that the six factors were useful for "suggesting to counsel where briefing might ...

be directed"

when advancing an argument that a case should be decided on independent state
constitutional grounds.58 The six factors also help to ensure that should the court
rely upon independent state constitutional grounds, the decision is based upon
sound legal reasons, and not "merely substituting [the court's] notion of justice
for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court."59
The Washington court provided the following explanations of the six factors:
1.

The textual language of the state constitution.The text of the
state constitution may provide cogent grounds for a decision different from that which would be arrived at under the
federal constitution. It may be more explicit or it may have
no precise federal counterpart at all.

52 Id. at 622-25 (Golden, J., concurring).

5 Id. at 621 (Golden, J., concurring).
5 Id. (Golden, J., concurring) ("It is not the function of this court to frame appellant's
argument or draw his issues for him.").
15 Id. (Golden, J., concurring).
56 Saldana, 846 P.2d at 622 (Golden, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 621-23 (Golden, J., concurring) (citing State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash.

1986)). In Gunwall, the Washington court determined whether the Washington
Constitution allowed law enforcement to obtain, without "proper legal process," long-distance phone records and pen registers listing calls dialed from a particular phone number.
720 P.2d at 811. After an analysis of the six factors, the Washington court determined that
the Washington Constitution provided greater protections than the Fourth Amendment,
requiring that authorities go through a judicial process before obtaining phone numbers
from long-distance records and pen registers. Id. at 816.
58 Gunwall, 720 P2d at 816.
59Id.
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Significant differences in the texts ofparallelprovisions of the
federalandstate constitutions. Such differences may also warrant reliance on the state constitution. Even where parallel
provisions of the two constitutions do not have meaningful
differences, other relevant provisions of the state constitution may require that the state constitution be interpreted
differently.

3.

State constitutional and common law history. This may
reflect an intention to confer greater protection from the
state government than the federal constitution affords from
the federal government. The history of the adoption of a
particular state constitutional provision may reveal an intention that will support reading the provision independently
of federal law.

4.

Preexistingstate law. Previously established bodies of state
law, including statutory law, may also bear on the granting
of distinctive state constitutional rights. State law may be
responsive to concerns of its citizens long before they are
addressed by analogous constitutional claims. Preexisting
law can thus help to define the scope of a constitutional
right later established.

5.

Differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions. The former is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal government, and the latter serves to limit the sovereign
power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in
their elected representatives. Hence the explicit affirmation
of fundamental rights in ...[the] state['s] constitution may
be seen as a guaranty of those rights rather than as a restriction on them.

6.

Mattersofparticularstate interestor localconcern. Is the subject
matter local in character, or does there appear to be a need
for national uniformity? The former may be more appropriately addressed by resorting to the state constitution. 6

Vol. 7

According to Justice Golden, an analysis based on these factors fosters "princi61
pled" decisions that provide a sufficient basis for predicting the court's direction.
He stated that merely "sidestepping" review by the United States Supreme Court
under Long is not enough: "A grudging parallel citation to a state constitution, or
60
61

Id. at 812-13 (emphasis added).
Saldana, 846 P.2d at 623 (Golden, J., concurring).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3
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an argument that the state particularly values the rights of its citizens, in a brief
devoted to federal law does nothing to aid in the development of state jurisprudence .... 62 Those reading the decision should be able to tell what factors would
lead the court "to decide one way or the other."63 The goal is to create, through
"the customary process of research and reasoning," a "principled ... body of state
constitutional law" that "truly supports the state constitution, as state court judges
and lawyers are charged to do. ' 64 As a result, a "principled basis for repudiating
federal precedent" is created that provides a "rational basis for counsel to predict
the future course of state decisional law."'65 Therefore, Wyoming's traffic-detention
rule should sufficiently describe the relevant factors so that those reading a decision can know why the court determined the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of the officer's actions, and decisions made under the rule should provide a basis
66
for predicting the court's future actions.

C. Search and Seizure
A Wyoming traffic-detention rule must be consistent with Wyoming's overall
search-and-seizure doctrine. Though the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution are nearly
identical textually, the two provisions evolved independently, and the courts have
given them differing interpretations. 67 Early Wyoming cases held that Article
1, Section 4 was bound tightly to the right against self-incrimination, which is
expressed in the Wyoming Constitution through Article 1, Section I . This
caused Article 1, Section 4 and the Fourth Amendment to receive distinct interpretations and has given the right against self-incrimination considerable force in

62

Id. (Golden, J., concurring).

63 Id. (Golden, J., concurring).
(4

Id. (Golden, J., concurring).

65 Gunwall,720 P.2d at 812.
66 Saldana, 846 P.2d at 623 (Golden, J., concurring).
67 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights,

90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 500 n.78 (1977) ("[E]xamples abound where state courts have
independently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow
opinions of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the
state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased."). See also Wallace
P Carson, Jr., "Last Things Last'" A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State
Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 641, 652 (1983) (stating that a constitutional provision
in Oregon should receive a different interpretation than a similar provision of the United
States Constitution, even though both have identical language). For a comparison of
the text of Article 1, Section 4 and the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 195-99 and
accompanying text.
68 State v. George, 231 P. 683, 685 (Wyo. 1924) (holding that using evidence gathered
from a defendant through an illegal search is equivalent to forcing the defendant to testify
against himself).
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Wyoming. 69 The tie between self-incrimination and search and seizure was such
that the Wyoming Supreme Court used the connection as the basis for Wyoming's
version of the exclusionary rule.7 °
The court described the connection in State v. George.7' Relying upon the
United States Supreme Court case Boyd v. United States, the Wyoming court
held that an unreasonable seizure of a person's papers, and use of those papers as
72
evidence, was the equivalent of forcing the defendant to testify against herself.
Then the Wyoming court took the principle further, stating that no difference
existed between using papers that were unreasonably confiscated as evidence and
using any otherproperty seized unreasonably from a person's premises. 73 The court
equated use of evidence seized unreasonably from a person's possession to using
testimony acquired through duress:
What is the difference in principle in forcing a defendant to
speak against himself by word of mouth, and in forcing, by an
unlawful search, the secret things of his home to give evidence
against him? We see none. His home is as sacred from illegal
force as his person. When his home speaks, he speaks-they
74
speak with the same voice.
69

See Tobin v. State, 255 P.788, 788-89 (Wyo. 1927) (indicating that the warrantless entry
of a premises without permission of owner, and subsequent confiscation of contraband
found therein, violated protections against unreasonable search and seizure, due process
and self-incrimination); State v. George, 231 P. 683, 686 (Wyo. 1924) (holding that use of
evidence taken from a defendant's possession through an unreasonable search is equivalent
to forcing him to testify against himself); Wiggin v. State, 206 P. 373, 376 (Wyo. 1922)
(noting that an arrest made under an illegal warrant, which led to the confiscation of the
hide from a stolen cow, implicated both Article 1, Section 4 and Article 1, Section 11 of
the Wyoming Constitution); State v. Peterson, 194 P 342, 352-54 (Wyo. 1920) (holding
that return of contraband liquor confiscated through an illegal warrant was necessary
because to do otherwise would violate search-and-seizure rights as well as the right against
self-incrimination); Maki v. State, 112 P.334, 336 (Wyo. 1911) (holding that persons
placed in detention must be advised that they have the right to remain silent, fifty years
before federal courts reached a similar decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 383 U.S. 436
(1966)).
70 George, 231 P at 686.
71Id. at 684 ("Both of the foregoing constitutional provisions [Article 1, Section 4 and
Article 1, Section 11] were referred to in the Peterson [194 P 342 (Wyo. 1920)] case, as
well as the Wiggin [206 P 373 (Wyo. 1922)] case, but their interrelation was not clearly
pointed out, and it will be necessary here to do so in view of the contentions that are made
herein by the defendant.").
72 Id. at 685 (referring to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
71Id. ("There does not, however, appear to be any difference in principle between documents which may be used in evidence against a defendant and any other property which
may be so used.").
71Id. (quoting Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 (Miss. 1922)).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3
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Based on this reasoning, the Wyoming court concluded that unreasonably seized
evidence could not be used against a defendant. 75 In a later case, the Wyoming
court held it immaterial that evidence uncovered in an unreasonable search was
contraband, forbidding the use of contraband after it was unreasonably seized
from a premises.

76

An examination of the history of the Fourth Amendment shows that federal
restrictions regarding the use of unreasonably seized material proceeded along a
different path than those offered in Wyoming, although the two began from a
similar starting point. In the late Nineteenth Century, the United States Supreme
Court also connected search and seizure with the right against self-incrimination, but the connection under the federal doctrine eventually lost its force. 77 The
federal courts made this connection through Boyd v. United States-the same case
relied upon by the Wyoming Supreme Court. 78 However, the protections provided
under the federal doctrine were more limited than those offered in Wyoming,
79
reaching private papers and books, but not other types of personal property.
71 Id. at 686.
76

77

Tobin v. State, 255 P. 788, 789 (Wyo. 1927).
See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,

A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 2.6(e) (4th ed. 2004).
78

See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
supra note 77, § 2.6(e). It should be noted that though the Wyoming

79 1 LAFAvE,

Supreme Court's decision to extend protections under Boyd to personal property other
than papers and books appears to depart from federal doctrine, as a practical matter
the Fourth Amendment and the Wyoming provision had a similar reach because of a
Fourth Amendment concept called the "mere-evidence rule." See 1 id. § 2.6(d). The
mere-evidence rule, which has since fallen into disuse, stated that possessions that were
not fruits or instrumentalities of a crime were "mere evidence," and therefore, could not
be subject to a search warrant. See 1 id. § 2.6(e), at 703-05 nn.150-59 and accompanying text. Therefore, like Wyoming's extension of the right against self-incrimination, the
mere-evidence rule protected personal property other than books or writings. See 1 id. §
2.6(e), at 707 nn. 167-69 (describing how the mere evidence rule and the link that existed
between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment provided similar protections).
The mere-evidence rule came into American law from England through Boyd, the same
case that linked search and seizure with the right against self-incrimination. Compare 1
id § 2.6(d), at 703-04 nn.150-52 (noting that the mere-evidence rule was introduced
into American law through Boyd, which relied upon the famous English case Entick v.
Carrington, 19 How.St.Tri. 1029 (1765)) and State v. George, 231 P 683, 685 (Wyo.
1924) (relying upon Boyd and Entick to link Section 4 and Section 11 of Article 1). The
term "mere evidence" was never used in connection with search and seizure by Wyoming
courts, and every time the Wyoming Supreme Court cited Boyd, the reference was firmly
connected with the right against self-incrimination; therefore, though the mere-evidence
rule had considerable force under federal law, it was never incorporated into Wyoming's
search-and-seizure doctrine. See Tobin v. State, 255 P. 788, 798 (Wyo. 1927) (citing Boyd
to support the notion that the United States Supreme Court has stressed the importance
of protecting rights offered under the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment, in
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As the doctrine evolved, lower courts administered the link between the Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment inconsistently, causing the doctrine to remain
controversial until the United States Supreme Court settled the issue in Andresen
v. Marylandin 1976.80

Andresen weakened the link between search and seizure and the right against
self-incrimination by creating a distinction between the act of compelling a defendant to produce papers, and the use of papers as evidence after the papers became
available to authorities through legitimate means.8 1 After Andresen, use of a writing against a defendant was not a violation of the right against self-incrimination
82
if authorities acquired the writing by a means that involved no compulsion.
Some saw this as a retreat. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., noted
that the overturning of Boyd was one of several decisions by the Burger court that
withdrew protections granted by the United States Supreme Court during the
1960s under the Bill of Rights.83 Reacting to this withdrawal, Brennan urged state

support of the link between search and seizure and self-incrimination under state law);
State v. Crump, 246 P. 241, 242 (Wyo. 1926) (using Boyd to support the notion that

just as Section 4 and Section 11 are linked under state law, under federal law, the "Fifth
Amendment protects every person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained
through search or seizure made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment").
The mere-evidence rule became plagued with exceptions, and in the end was so ineffective
that the United States Supreme Court put it to death in 1967 with Warden v. Heyden, 387
U.S. 294 (1976). See I LAFAVE supra, § 2.6(d), at 706-77 nn.164-66.
80 1 LAFAvE, supra note 77, § 2.6(e), at 708 nn.172-75 and accompanying text (referencing Andresen v. Maryland, 472 U.S. 463 (1976)).
81 1 LAFAvE, supra note 77, § 2.6(e), at 708 nn. 172-75 and accompanying text.
82 1 LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 2.6(e), at 710 n.184 (citing State v. Barrett, 401 N.W2d 184
(Iowa 1987) (using as evidence a personal journal containing death threats is permissible
when the journal was given to police by a restaurant employee after it was left at the
restaurant) and State v. Andrei, 574 A.2d 295 (Me. 1990) (holding that a diary can be
used as evidence after being presented to police by the writer's spouse because the police
acquisition of the diary involved no compulsion).
83 Justice Walter J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionsoflndividual Rights,
90 HALv. L. Rv. 489, 496-97 nn.45-5 4 and accompanying text (1977). In support
of his assertion that the Court had withdrawn protections previously offered between
1962 and 1969 under the Bill of Rights, Brennan cited the following cases: Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding the First Amendment "insufficiently flexible to
guarantee access to essential public forums when in our evolving society those traditional
forums are under private ownership in the form of suburban shopping centers"); Young
v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (holding the First Amendment no
longer invalidated "a system of restrictions on motion-picture theaters based upon the
content of their presentations"); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (finding
it reasonable for a postal authority to make a warrantless arrest in a public place when
there existed probable cause based upon reliable information, and when the arrest was
conducted under a statute authorizing arrests based upon a reasonable belief that a crime
was occurring in the postal authority's presence); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
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courts to "step into the breach" and grant independent protections that replaced
those no longer offered federally. s4
The federal tenet departed further from that offered in Wyoming when tensions between the federal doctrine and search-and-seizure doctrines employed by
5
states led to the total demise of Boyd, and eventually to Mapp v. Ohio. The
notoriety of Boyd deteriorated largely at the hands of state officials through the
"silver platter doctrine. '86 The "silver-platter doctrine" allowed state officials to
acquire evidence in a manner prohibited by federal law, who then passed that
evidence on to federal officials.8 7 Then the federal officials could introduce the
suspect evidence in federal court.88 This diminished the effectiveness of the federal
exclusionary rule.89 In its repudiation of the "silver-platter doctrine" in Elkins
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the lack of
uniformity between state and federal exclusionary doctrines had led to violations
of the Fourth Amendment.9" This set the stage for Mapp v. Ohio, which required
states to grant search-and-seizure doctrines that were, at least, equivalent to those
offered by federal courts. 9

Wyoming, like other states, followed the precepts of Mapp by applying the
92
federal Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine instead of its own.
Thus, the federal exclusionary rule became the mechanism that caused Wyoming's
until the
search-and-seizure doctrine to fall into hibernation for thirty-eight years,
93
State.
v.
Vasquez
with
1999
in
it
revived
Court
Wyoming Supreme
(1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) and South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976) (refusing to hold unreasonable warrantless searches subsequent to
arrest and warrantless inventory searches of automobiles); United States v. Watson, 423

U.S. 411 (1976) and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that
authorities need not demonstrate that a suspect in custody knew of his right to refuse
before granting consent to allow a search); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)
(holding that unreasonably collected evidence can be used when the search or seizure
was conducted by authorities acting in good faith); Brennan, supra note 83, at 496-97
nn.45-5 4 and accompanying text.
84 Brennan, supra note 83, at 503.
85 See 1 LAFAvE, supra note 77, § 1.1(d) (referring to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961)).
86 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 1.1 (d).
87 See 1 id.
88 See 1 id.
89 See 1 id.
90 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960).
9'See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 654-55 (1961)). Of course, states can still have search-and-seizure doctrines under
their own constitutions, but to be enforced those doctrines must, at a minimum, grant
protections equivalent to those offered under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
92 Id.
91Id.at 485.
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Significantly, the concurrence to Mapp written by Justice Black unknowingly
gave final acknowledgement to the common sources of the Wyoming and federal
exclusionary doctrines by stating that an exclusionary rule based solely upon the
Fourth Amendment was unconvincing, but when the Fourth Amendment was
considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled selfincrimination, "a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually
requires the exclusionary rule."94 Since Mapp, the United State Supreme Court has
drawn distinctions between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment,
stating that the two provisions have different purposes, and therefore, the exclusionary rules provided under the two provisions are subject to different analysis. 95
Therefore, the federal search-and-seizure doctrine is distinct from Wyoming's in
that under the federal rule, the link between the Fourth Amendment and the
96
Fifth Amendment is tenuous.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has yet to acknowledge, in the post- Vasquez
era, that a link exists between search and seizure and the right against self-incrimination. 97 This does not mean that the link has not operated in the background;
for example, in O'Boyle, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied upon Tobin v. State,
which like other pre-Mapp cases placed a pre-eminence upon the right against
self-incrimination.98 Consequently, even if the Wyoming Supreme Court has yet
to recognize the close link between search and seizure and the right against selfincrimination, the concept already has impacted the court's search-and-seizure
decisions. 99

94 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring).
95 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975) (holding that the exclusionary rule,
when used to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are
distinct from those it serves under the Fifth Amendment, since it is directed at all unlawful
searches and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating material); see also 1
LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 2.6(e). Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has limited use of the exclusionary rule to those instances where the rule acts as a disincentive to
unreasonable officials. 1 LAFAvE, supra note 77, % 1.1 (f)-1.2(f). The Wyoming Supreme
Court never applied a similar limitation to Wyoming's exclusionary rule.
96 1 LAFAVE, supra note 77, % 1.1(f)-1.2(f).
97See Page v. State, 63 P3d 904, 911 (Wyo. 2003) (stating that the Wyoming Supreme
Court has yet to be called upon to determine whether the good-faith exception applies to
the Wyoming exclusionary rule).
98 O'Boyle v. State, 117 P3d 401, 413 (Wyo. 2005). See Tobin v. State, 255 P 788, 788
(Wyo. 1927) (accepting the defendant's argument that sheriff's actions were in violation
of Section 4 (search and seizure), Section 11 (right against self-incrimination), and Section
6 (due process) of Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution).
99 See O'Boyle, 117 P3d at 412 (relying upon Tobin for the court's holding that peaceful
submission does not grant consent to search, which is consistent with Wyoming's preMapp stance on the right against self-incrimination).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3
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In summary, even though Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution are nearly identical textually, over time the documents have received distinctive interpretations.' 00
Early in the last century, the Wyoming Supreme Court bound Article 1, Section 4
up with the right against self-incrimination, which finds its expression under the
Wyoming Constitution in Article 1, Section 11.101 In contrast, the most recent
holdings of United States Supreme Court state that the Fourth Amendment
and the Fifth Amendment serve distinct purposes, and the two should receive
separate analysis.'0 2 Therefore, in spite of the textual similarities between Article
1, Section 4 and the Fourth Amendment, the two are supported by a different set
of rationales, and it cannot be assumed that the two provisions provide identical
protections to travelers who become subject to search-and-seizure activities during
a traffic detention.
D. Reasonableness
A traffic-detention rule must also be consistent with the Wyoming provision
that allows officers to investigate if they have a reasonable belief that a crime is
underway.'03 For example, in State v. George a deputy, who was on property legally,
discovered sheep he reasonably believed to be stolen. 0 4 Following up on this, the
deputy later went to the suspect's residence with other men and met the suspect in
the yard.'0 5 The deputy had a warrant, but because the warrant had been granted
improperly, it was invalid. 0 6 The deputy arrested the man and seized stolen sheep
from a group located within sight near the residence. 0 7 Then the deputy and the
men with him proceeded to another band located on the open range and seized
thirty-two other sheep that appeared to be stolen. 8 The Wyoming Supreme

'00 See supra notes 67-99.
"01See supra notes 68-76.
102 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
03 State v. Young, 281 P. 17, 19 (Wyo. 1929) (citing favorably State ex rel. Hansen v.
District Court, 233 P 126, 129 (Mont. 1925) (holding that an officer may conduct reasonable investigations when the facts and circumstances would cause a reasonable man,
acting in good faith, to believe that a crime was being committed in his presence).
104State v. George, 231 P. 683, 684 (Wyo. 1924).
105

Id.

Id. The court stated that the affidavit was "substantially in the form as the [improper]
warrant considered . . . in the case of Wigin v. State," adding that the prosecution in
George "conceded" that the form was improper. Id. (citing Wiggin v. State, 206 P 373
(Wyo. 1922)). In Wiggin, an affidavit was issued based upon the officer's "belief" that
evidence of a crime could be found at a location, rather than on information with enough
particularity to allow the magistrate to independently assess whether the officer had probable cause. 206 P at 376. (citing State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342 (Wyo. 1920)).
"o7George, 231 P at 684.
108 Id.
106
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Court held that even though the warrant was improper, the officer had probable
cause to believe that a felony had occurred, and the officer had a right to be at the
arrest location, so the arrest was reasonable. °9 Furthermore, because the officer
had legal access to the location of the sheep, the court allowed the seizure of the
stolen livestock."'
Consistent with George, the court held in State v. Kelly that in some circumstances a warrantless search of a motorized vehicle may be allowed. 1 ' However,
the court also noted that an officer must have good reason to make the initial
stop:
[It] would ordinarily be intolerable and unreasonable, if an officer
or anyone else were authorized to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding liquor and thus subject persons lawfully using
the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of a search
without a search warrant; that those entitled to use the public
highways, have a right of free passage without interruption of
search, unless a competent official authorized to search has probable cause for believing that a vehicle is carrying contraband or
illegal goods." 2
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted "the distinction that has always been
observed in the laws of the United States between a home and vehicles." 13 While
a warrantless search of a home is prohibited in almost all circumstances, a search
of an automobile without a warrant is subject to a lower standard, meaning
the warrantless search of a vehicle "cannot be said to be unreasonable under all
circumstances."'14
Many of the pre-Mapp cases indicate factors that could be relevant for weighing the reasonableness of an officer's actions at modern traffic stops. 115 Of these

Id. at 690.
Id. at 689 (noting that when the officer has lawful access and evidence of a crime is
visible to the officer, "ready to be taken," the evidence may be seized upon lawful arrest
of the defendant).
"' State v. Kelly, 268 P. 571, 572 (Wyo. 1928) (noting that "a search of an automobile without a warrant, authorized by law, cannot be said to be unreasonable under all
109

1"0

circumstances").
112

Id. (relying upon Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).

Id.
Id.
115The Wyoming Supreme Court actively interpreted Article 1, Section 4 during the
Prohibition Era (1920-1933), when law enforcement resources were focused upon the
interdiction of forbidden liquor. See State v. Munger, 4 P.2d 1094 (Wyo. 1931); State v.
Young, 281 P 17 (Wyo. 1929); State v. Kelly, 268 P 571 (Wyo. 1928).
113

114
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early cases, State v. Young is of particular interest.116 Although the chief holding of
the case concerned a search incident to a lawful arrest, within the case the court
adopted a series of search-and-seizure holdings from other states related to traffic
detentions. 17 These included State ex rel Hansen v. District Court (Montana),
holding that no violation of the state search-and-seizure provisions occurred when
facts were such that "a reasonable man, acting in good faith, [would] believe that a
crime was being committed in his presence"; Sands v. State (Oklahoma), holding
no violation of the state's search-and-seizure provision occurred when an officer,
attracted by the odor of whiskey, discovers whiskey kegs by using a flashlight
to look through the isinglass of an automobile; State v. Lofiis (Missouri), holding that an officer may use all senses, including the sense of smell, to reach a
reasonable belief that a crime is occurring in the officer's presence; and State v.
Connor (Missouri), holding it reasonable for an officer to investigate because of
the "unusual parking of [a] car," which led to the smelling of whiskey from the car,
which led to observing a jug through an open car window and then through an
1 18
open door, which led, finally, to a physical examination and seizure of the jug.
From these holdings, it can be determined that the Wyoming Constitution allows
officers involved in traffic detentions to investigate when the facts are such that a
reasonable man would conclude a crime is occurring in his presence; officers can
use their senses, including sight and smell, to reach that reasonable belief; and
they can take reasonable steps to investigate, such as look inside a window using
a flashlight. " 9
The pre-Mapp cases also illustrate that an officer's conduct must be reasonable in all circumstances, supporting the principle that the officer must have a just
reason for initiating the contact that leads to the search. 2 ° In State v. Munger, an
officer contacted two people sitting in a car, a passenger and a driver. 21 The driver,
who was the defendant in the case, was charged later for possession of a bottle of
liquor, while the passenger was arrested at the scene for being intoxicated. 122 The
officer seized the bottle of liquor after finding it in the front of the car between
the two men. 23 But the officer's discovery of the liquor occurred after the officer
removed the driver's friend from the passenger side of the vehicle while making the
arrest. 124 The court found that being drunk was not a crime statutorily or under

H6 Young, 281 P. 17 (Wyo. 1929).
117 Id. at 19-21.
11' Id. (citing State ex. relHansen, 233 P. 126, 129 (Mont. 1925); Sands v. State, 252 P.
72 (Okla. 1927); State v. Loftis, 292 S.W 29 (Mo. 1927); State v. Connor, 300 S.W 685
(Mo. 1927)).
119 Id.
120 See State v. Munger, 4 P2d 1094, 1095 (Wyo. 1931).
121 Id. at 1094.
122

Id.

123

Id

124

Id.
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the common law, so the arrest was unlawful. 2 5 Because the arrest was unreasonable and the officer made no showing to indicate that he had probable cause to
believe the vehicle contained alcohol, fruits from the arrest were not allowed, and
the bottle of liquor was excluded from evidence. 126 This case demonstrated that
unreasonable actions by an officer early in a traffic detention can cause evidence
127
discovered later in the stop to be inadmissible.
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court, prior to Mapp, placed a premium
upon the state's sovereignty, the Wyoming court also stated expressly that the
state's search-and-seizure rule should consider the needs of the nation as a whole
when weighing what search-and-seizure actions are reasonable. 28 The court not
only stated this expressly, but demonstrated this through its close examination
of the Fourth Amendment, and through the scrutiny it gave federal cases before
deciding its own issues under the Wyoming Constitution. 29 The court's concern
seemed to be that the state act in unison with the United States rather than be
a disruptive influence. 13 Therefore, even though Wyoming's pre-Mapp searchand-seizure cases were not in lock-step with the Fourth Amendment, the cases
would not appear to support a traffic-detention doctrine that varies wildly from
3
protections provided under federal law.1 '
Finally, it should be noted that even though the pre-Mapp cases relevant to
a Wyoming traffic-detention rule have never been overturned and appear to be
good law, many of them have lain dormant since the passage of Mapp v. Ohio in
1961.132 The Wyoming Supreme Court's refusal to acknowledge arguments unless
properly raised in the lower courts using the six Saldana factors have resulted

125 Munger, 4 P.2d at 1095.
126 Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342 (Wyo. 1920).
127 See id.
128 State v. George, 231 P. 683, 686-87 (Wyo. 1924). The court stated,
The Government of the United States is not a foreign government in
its relation to the Government of the States, the agents of the former
are not agents of a foreign government in relation to the latter, and any
contrary doctrine could not but be deprecated as sowing pernicious
seeds of ultimate disruption of the nation. These factors, and others,
should be duly considered when the specific [search-and-seizure] question presented comes before us.
Id. at 687.
129 See State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342, 352-53 (Wyo. 1920) (adopting the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning from Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
130 See George, 231 P.at 686-87.
131See supra note 128.
132 See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 (Wyo. 1999) (referencing Mapp v. Ohio, 376
U.S. 643 (1961)).
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133
in a piecemeal reintroduction of the pre-Mapp search-and-seizure doctrine.
Only a limited number of search-and-seizure issues have been brought current by
the Wyoming Supreme Court through recent decisions. 134 In Vasquez, the court
addressed searches incident to arrest, refusing to adopt the federal Belton rule
because the rule was inconsistent with early state doctrine. 135 In O'Boyle, the court
relied upon Tobin v. State, holding that state must show by "clear and convincing
13 6
In
testimony" that consent to search at a traffic stop was voluntarily given.
is
identical
Johnson v. State, the court held that Wyoming's inventory search rule
to the federal rule. 37 Whether the Wyoming Supreme Court will choose to revive
the entirety of the pre-Mapp search-and-seizure reasonableness doctrine remains
uncertain.

E.

Traffic Detentions under the FourthAmendment

A sufficient traffic-detention doctrine must base itself upon the nature of
traffic stops. 138 Under the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of a traffic stop is not
139
to support the investigation of crimes, but to enforce traffic laws. Therefore, the
4°
stop is limited in scope and short in duration. These characteristics resemble
those of investigative detention. 141 Consequently, federal search-and-seizure
doctrine holds that the limited characteristics of traffic stops are consistent with
the two-prong test of Terry v. Ohio.142 The two-prong test requires, first, that
the reason for the stop be justified, and, second, that all actions during the stop
remain within the scope defined by the stop's purpose-in the case of a traffic
do without
detention, the issuance of a traffic citation. 4 3 What an officer 1can
44
exceeding the scope of a traffic stop has been strictly established.
Therefore, under the Terry doctrine, the Wyoming Supreme Court has established specific guidelines regarding what is reasonable for an officer to do during
a traffic stop. 45 Traffic stops must be "temporary, lasting no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop," and the officer must carefully tailor the
For an explication of the six Saldana factors, see supra notes 57-66 and accompanying
text.
134 See Vasquez, 990 P2d at 476 and O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005).
135 Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 489 (referring to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)). For
an explication of the Belton rule, see infra note 181.
136 O'Boyle, 117 P.3d at 413 n.9 (relying upon Tobin v. State, 255 P 788 (Wyo. 1927)).
137 137 P3d 907, 908-09 (Wyo. 2006).
138See Lindsay v. State, 108 P3d 852, 857 (Wyo. 2005).
'39 See id.
140 See id.
14'See id.
142 Id. at 856-57.
'43 Lindsay, 108 P.3d at 856-57.
141 Id. at 857.
145 Id.
133
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'
stop to "its underlying justification." 146
An officer may request the driver's proof
of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, and may run a computer
check and issue a citation. 147 Once the officer issues the citation and checks the
documentation, the traveler "must be allowed to proceed without further delay."' 48
To justify any "searches" beyond these actions, the officer must point to "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. " "'

Although the Fourth Amendment case law is very specific with regard to
what an officer can do at a traffic stop when the stated governmental interest
is the enforcement of traffic laws, an officer who is legitimately in pursuit of
another interest might be allowed greater freedom. 50 The case law weighs the
interest against the intrusiveness of the search or seizure. 15 1 Some interests warrant more intrusion than others; for example, safety creates a higher interest
than the enforcement of laws.' 52 Therefore, in Terry v. Ohio the United States
Supreme Court found it reasonable for the officer to pat down the outside of
the defendant's clothing in search of weapons, though a pat-down would have
been impermissible if conducted merely to investigate the suspect's suspicious
behavior.' When the government invades a protected interest, Terry holds that
the only test for reasonableness is whether the action's intrusiveness outweighs
the government's need to search. 154The Fourth Amendment, therefore, employs
a balancing test-weighing the need for governmental action against the privacy
interest that the government seeks to invade."'

146 Campbell

v. State, 97 P3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting United States v. Wood, 106
E3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997)).
17 Campbell, 97 P.3d at 785 (citing Damato v. State, 64 P3d at 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003)).
148 Id.
149 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968). Federal circuit courts differ over what is allowable during a traffic stop. For example, the Tenth Circuit held that the officer cannot ask
the traveler directly about suspected illegal activities without expanding the scope of the
traffic stop, unless the questions concern issues pertinent to officer safety. United States v.
Holt, 264 E3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001). However, the Fifth Circuit held such questions allowable in any case. United States v. Shabazz, 993 E.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
See United States v. Flowers, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10111 (D. Fla. 2004) (comparing
the rules in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits).
151See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
11 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (noting that officer safety is a higher interest than the
investigation of crime and warrants a greater amount of intrusion into the subject's
person).
152

Id.

Id.
154
Id.at 21.
153

"I See id.
at 23-24.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3

22

Mecklenburg: Fixing O'Boyle v. State - Traffic Detentions under Wyoming's Emer

2007

COMMENT

The amount of intrusion of an officer's actions is measured by how much
inconvenience the intrusion creates, or the privacy interest that it invades.' 56 For
example, an officer can arrange to routinely run a drug dog around the outside of
a car while a traffic ticket is being issued so long as use of the dog does nothing
to delay the traveler's departure. 57
1 The Fourth Amendment permits this because,
according to the Court, the use of an adequately trained drug dog only reveals
the presence of illegal drugs, which are contraband and, therefore, not an interest
that "society is prepared to consider reasonable."' 158 But use of the dog becomes
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment if the use delays the traveler and causes
inconvenience. 5 9 The delay expands the scope of the stop into a drug investigation, which cannot be pursued unless the officer has some level of proof that a
crime is occurring. 6 ° Therefore, the amount of delay is one consideration the
court finds relevant in determining an officer's reasonableness. 6 ' Other considerations include the amount of intimidation or official show of force made by the
officer, whether the officer's request for consent to search was coercive, whether
a reasonable person, given the entirety of the circumstances, would feel free to
62
leave. 1
Thus, the Fourth Amendment's traffic detention rule is specifically designed
to fit the limitations and scope inherent in a traffic stop.' 63 The rule provides
specific guidance to officers conducting the stop, indicating what actions are reasonable and what are not."" Furthermore, Fourth Amendment decisions include
discussions that indicate what factors courts consider relevant when deciding
whether an officer's actions are reasonable, providing a basis for predicting future
decisions. 6 5 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment's traffic-detention rule is sufficient
156 See

id.

157
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005).
158Id.at 408.
159Id.at

407-08 (noting with approval that the Illinois Supreme Court held in People v.
Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002) that a use of a drug dog that lengthened a stop created a
seizure requiring at least reasonable suspicion).
160 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968)) (noting that police have authority to make a "forcible stop" when the officer has
"reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity").
161See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
162 See 4 LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 9.3. LaFave criticizes some courts for exceeding the
bounds of Terry by allowing officers to seek consent from the travelers for a vehicle search
though the officers have no reasonable suspicion that contraband is present. 4 Id § 9.3(e),
at 397 nn.213-17 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of factors relevant
to determining whether the employment of a drug dog during a traffic detention is
reasonable.
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to meet all of the requirements put forth by Justice Golden in Saldanav. State for
the Wyoming Constitution, providing a "principled basis for the decisions" and a
"rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of ...decisional law."' 166

F

Traffic Detentions underArticle 1, Section 4

As mentioned earlier, the one opportunity the Wyoming Supreme Court has
had to decide a traffic-detention issue since its decision to revitalize Wyoming's
search-and-seizure doctrine came in O'Boyle v. State.167 The O'Boyle decision analyzed three phases of the traffic stop: The traffic stop and the initial detention, a
68
second detention and further questioning, and the defendant's consent to search.
Each phase was considered twice, once under the Wyoming Constitution and
once under the Fourth Amendment. 6 9 This comment focuses on the first stage,
the traffic stop and the initial detention. The other two holdings are not relevant
to this discussion because they occurred after the traffic detention. 17
The circumstances of O'Boyle arose out of a typical traffic stop. Kevin O'Boyle
was pulled over for driving 79 in a 75 mile-per-hour zone on Interstate 80 near
Cheyenne, Wyoming. 17' The trooper asked O'Boyle to walk back and sit in
the cruiser while the trooper conducted the usual procedures associated with a
traffic stop. 172 The trooper requested O'Boyle's criminal history from dispatch,
and as he waited for the reply, he questioned O'Boyle extensively, asking over
thirty questions. 173 As the trooper waited for the criminal history and continued

166
See supra notes
167
168
169
170

61-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2005).
Compare id. at 409-14 (Article 1, Section 4) with id. at 414-19 (Fourth Amendment).
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.

171O'Boyle, 117 P.3d at 404.
172

Id.

173
Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment held that

a trooper could not ask directly about drug trafficking or other wrongdoing without, first,
having a reasonable articulable suspicion that the allegation was true, so the questioning
may have been an attempt to raise a suspicion by uncovering discrepancies in O'Boyle's
cover story. See Campbell v. State, 785 P3d 781, 785 (Wyo. 2004). The interrogation
included a series of questions that would be routine if asked by themselves, including,
where was O'Boyle headed, how long did he plan to stay, where was he coming from,
what did he do for a living, how long had he had been doing it, who was filling in for him
while he was gone, how long had his son been in Boston, what college did his son attend,
what courses was his son taking in college, was his son living on campus, where would
O'Boyle stay while visiting his son, why was he driving rather than flying, why was the
rental car in his daughter's name, where was his daughter at the time, how many daughters
did he have, and what was the price of airfare from San Francisco to Boston. O'Boyle, 117
R3d at 404.
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questioning, he requested that a second trooper bring a drug dog. 174 Finally, the
trooper indicated that O'Boyle was free to leave and returned the suspect's documents. 75 But as O'Boyle walked back to his vehicle, the officer questioned him
again, ultimately obtaining O'Boyle's agreement to search the vehicle. 176 Inside
177
the vehicle, the trooper found five pounds of marijuana.
The traffic-detention rule articulated in O'Boyle by the Wyoming Supreme
Court holds that "only unreasonable searches are forbidden, and whether or not a
search is reasonable is a question of law to be decided from all the circumstances
of a case." 178 This same rule is used by the court in all search-and-seizure analyses
under the Wyoming Constitution, and the court makes no effort to distinguish
traffic detentions from other search-and-seizure problems.179 The first prong of this
test-"only unreasonable searches are forbidden"-appears to permit any official
pursuit of information, provided that the pursuit is reasonable. 180 The second
prong-"whether or not a search is reasonable is a question of law to be decided
from all the circumstances of a case"-seems to eschew the simplicity of bright
81
lines, requiring that the court consider the circumstances in their entirety.'
The court's rubric in O'Boyle-"whether or not a search is reasonable is a
question of law to be decided from all the circumstances of a case"-failed to indi174
175
176
177
178
'79

O'Boyle, 117 P.3d at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 410. The court states: "In the broader context of searches and seizures in general

and for purposes of considering Mr. O'Boyle's claim.., what is important about Vasquez
is our holding that Article 1, Section 4 requires that searches and seizures be reasonable
under all the circumstances.") Id. (emphasis added).
180 State v. George, 231 P. 683, 687 (Wyo. 1924)("Not all searches and seizures are forbidden, but only those that are unreasonable.").
181 Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that Article 1, Section 4
eschews the bright-line rule of Belton, and "maintains a standard that requires a search be
reasonable under all of the circumstances as determined by the judiciary, in light of the
historical intent of [Wyoming's] search and seizure provision"). The holding of New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) was designed to simplify a series of conflicting United
States Supreme Court cases regarding searches of automobile passenger compartments
subsequent to the arrest of the driver. Id. at 480 (interpreting Belton, 453 U.S. at 458).
The Belton rule allowed police to search the entire passenger compartment, including
areas of the car out of reach of the driver such as sealed containers. Id. at 481 (interpreting
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61). The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the Belton rule was
designed to serve a "national citizenry" and should not be applied to Wyoming. Id. at
489. Rejecting the bright line offered by Belton, the court limited the search to areas of
the vehicle within the driver's reach, adopting a seamless standard that requires the court
to consider all the circumstances of the case. Id. ("Is this result a narrower application than
Belton? We think so.").
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cate what factors the court found relevant under Wyoming law for determining
the reasonableness of the officer's actions, forcing the court to rely upon Fourth
Amendment concepts.' 82 For example, the court observed that "Mr. O'Boyle
had been detained and subjected to persistent and sustained questioning that
unreasonably expanded the scope of the stop far beyond the speedingoffense into a full-

blown drug investigation.'1 83 But the notion that a traffic stop has a "scope" that
should not be exceeded arises not from the Wyoming Constitution, but from the

Fourth Amendment and the Terry two-prong test.'84 Furthermore, the opinion
18 5
stated that the officer lacked "reasonable suspicion of other criminal activities."
The term "reasonable suspicion" is borrowed from Terry and its progeny and has
no direct counterpart in Wyoming law.' 86
The Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis did include one doctrine grounded
in Wyoming law when it noted that at "no time during this phase of the detention
did [the trooper] ask Mr. O'Boyle for his consent to this type of questioning
or detention.' 8 7 The trooper's questions could be seen as an attempt to illicit
incriminating information from the defendant, which is discouraged by case law
interpreting the Wyoming Constitution.'8 8 However, without pertinent authority

182
183
184

See O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 410-11 (Wyo. 2005).
Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968) ("And in determining whether the seizure

and search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one-whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and whether itwas reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."). Wyoming law has never
defined a traffic detention as having a scope. See State v. Young, 281 P. 17 (1929). The
concept of "scope" would be useful if applied to a Wyoming traffic stop; however, to do

so without expressly adopting the term blurs the distinction between Article 1, Section 4
and the Fourth Amendment. Wallace P. Carson, Jr., "LastThings Last"-A Methodological
Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 641, 651 (1983)

(advising those who make state constitutional arguments to avoid "commonplace federal
jurisprudential buzz words" because "[t]hey may very well impede your argument rather
than clarify it.").
185O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 410 (Wyo. 2005).
186 The test promulgated by Wyoming courts differed from that of Terry in that Terry was

designed to prevent crime, while the Wyoming test was designed to uncover crimes in
progress. Compare 4 LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 9.2(a), at 282-83 nn.2-4 and accompanying
text (noting that under Terry, crime prevention is the basis for the officer's reasonable belief
that a crime is afoot) andState v. Young, 281 P. 17, 19 (Wyo. 1929) (quoting State ex rel.
Hansen, v. District Court, 233 P. 126, 129 (Mont. 1929) ("Applying the test laid down
by this court in the cases heretofore cited, were those facts and circumstances such as to

cause a reasonable man, acting in good faith, to believe that a crime was being committed
in his presence?")) (emphasis added).
i87 O'Boyle, 117 P3d at 410-11.
188
See supra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/3

26

Mecklenburg: Fixing O'Boyle v. State - Traffic Detentions under Wyoming's Emer

2007

COMMENT

or explanation, the doctrine's use in this case provided no basis for understanding
the court's decision or for predicting future decisions.'89
Therefore, the O'Boyle traffic-detention rule failed to provide specific guidance to officers regarding what actions are reasonable and unreasonable, and
the description of factors that the court considered relevant to determining the
reasonableness of a traffic stop provided an insufficient basis for determining the
court's future actions.' 9" Consequently, the decision fell short of Justice Golden's
ideal, as expressed in Saldana v. State, that state constitutional decisions provide
a "principled ...

body of state constitutional law" that "truly supports the state

constitution, as state court judges and lawyers are charged to do."' 91

189
190

See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 623 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).
See id. Unfortunately, in Fertigthe court not only acknowledged, but legitimized the

use of federal concepts to support Wyoming's search-and-seizure law. Fertig v. State, 2006

WY 148, 19 ("In O'Boyle we tacitly endorsed the two-pronged Terry inquiry as providing an appropriate analytical framework for our reasonableness inquiry under Article 1,
Section 4."). Furthermore, in Fertig the Wyoming Supreme Court relied upon federal
law, and it referred to law in other states, but it offered nothing more than a general
acknowledgement of Wyoming case law. Id. 1 17-27. While recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment is persuasive in Wyoming and should be considered, reliance upon federal
law without any consideration of Wyoming cases and history does nothing to create the

"principled" body of state law advocated in Saldana v. State by Justice Golden and blurs
the distinction between federal and state search-and-seizure doctrines. See Saldana v. State,
846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring). Even though the analysis in Fertig
never cited Wyoming law, Wyoming cases could have been used to support the result.
First, the facts were such that a reasonable person would believe that a traffic violation
occurred in the officer's presence, which justified the initial stop. Id. I 10 ("Mr. Fertig does
not dispute that he was speeding or was clocked traveling 38 mph in a 30 mph zone."). See
State v. Young, 281 P. 17, 19 (Wyo. 1929) (citing State ex rel. Hansen v. District Court,
233 P. 126 (Mont. 1925) (noting that an arrest is not unreasonable when the conditions
surrounding the arrest are such to cause a reasonable man to believe a crime was occurring
in the officer's presence). Furthermore, the officer observed Fertig's drug paraphernalia
by standing outside the vehicle in a place the officer was permitted to be. Fertig, 2006
WY 142, 6. See State v. George, 231 P 686 (Wyo. 1924) (holding that an officer had
the power to seize stolen sheep because he was authorized to be on the property). The
defendant, with his own actions, exposed the drug paraphernalia to the officer's view
through the vehicle's window. Fertig,2006 WY 142, 6. See Young, 281 P. at 19 (citing
Sands v. State, 252 P. 72 (Okla. 1927) (noting an arrest is not unreasonable when an
officer, standing outside of a vehicle, observes contraband within the vehicle).
191 Saldana, 846 P2d at 623.
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III. ANALYSIS

A. Analysis ofthe Six "NeutralNon-exclusive Factors"
The question naturally arises, what would a properly grounded traffic-detention rule look like under the Wyoming Constitution? As was established earlier,
this question requires an analysis of six factors that the Wyoming Supreme Court
considers relevant to deciding whether the state constitution extends rights
which differ from those offered by the United States Constitution: 1) the textual
language of the provisions; 2) differences in the texts; 3) constitutional history;
4) state law which existed prior to the Wyoming Constitution; 5) structural differences between the two constitutions; and 6) matters of particular state or local
concern. 19 2 Not only must a traffic-detention rule be consistent with these factors,
it must fit in with Wyoming's general search-and-seizure doctrine as it has evolved
over time. 193 This inquiry will proceed with an analysis of the six factors, asking
of each, does the factor support a traffic-detention rule which provides greater or
lesser protection than the Fourth Amendment?

1.

Text and Textual Differences

An analysis of the first and second Saldanafactors considers the text of Article
1, Section 4, and any differences between the text of the Wyoming provision and
the Fourth Amendment, to determine whether protections at traffic detentions
194
under the Wyoming Constitution should differ from those offered federally.
As mentioned already, the text of Article 1, Section 4 is identical to the Fourth
Amendment except that the Wyoming provision requires an affidavit. 9 5 The
Fourth Amendment reads as follows,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The text of Article 1, Section 4, reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon prob192 Id.

at 622.

O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 410 (Wyo. 2005).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
191 State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342, 344-45 (Wyo. 1920).
193
194
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able cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.
According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the affidavit requirement creates
a higher standard than the Fourth Amendment because the Wyoming document
requires a permanent record. 196 But in Vasquez, the court rejected arguments that
the mere presence of the affidavit requirement demonstrated an intent by the
framers to provide greater protections overall, holding that the "slight textual
difference demonstrates little. ' 197 Furthermore, the warrant requirement has
minimal importance for traffic detentions because of the exigency that allows warrantless searches of mobile vehicles. 98 Consequently, the differences in the text,
in itself, appears to say little regarding whether protections provided under Article
1, Section 4 for travelers during traffic detentions should be greater or lesser than
those provided under the Fourth Amendment, other than to indicate that the
two provisions are not identical.1 99 However, as mentioned earlier, the texts of
the two provisions are supported by distinctive rationales. 00 Consequently, even
though their texts resemble each other, historically they have been given differing
interpretations, and the two provisions have produced unique analytical methods,
leading to similar, but not identical results. 01 Therefore, determining whether
the first and second Sa/dana factors support greater or lesser protection at traffic
detentions depends upon how those analytical methods apply to each case. 20 2 The
only conclusion that can be reached is that the two provisions may be similar, but
23
they are not identical.

Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 483 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting State v. Peterson, 194 P
342, 346 (1920)).
196

197

Id. at 485.

198See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying

text.

199 See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 485 ("[T]he slight textual difference demonstrates little.").
200 See supra notes 68-104 and accompanying text.
20 SeeJ. William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionsoflndividual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 500 (1977) ("[E]xamples abound where state courts have independently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions
of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state and
federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased.").
202 Vasquez, 900 P.2d at 485 ("It is a unique document, the supreme law of our state, and
this is sufficient reason to decide that it should be at issue whenever an individual believes

a constitutionally guaranteed right has been violated.").
But see supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (noting that Wyoming law requires
that holdings under the Wyoming Constitution consider the needs of the nation as a
whole and do not appear to support search-and-seizure rules that vary wildly from federal
law).
203
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Constitutionaland Common-law History

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that too little evidence can be found
in Wyoming's constitutional history to support a notion that the framers intended
to offer greater protections than the Fourth Amendment." 4 During debates, the
members of the Wyoming Constitutional Convention referred more frequently
to constitutions from other states than to the United States Constitution. 20 5 For
example, the delegates referred to the Colorado Constitution more than twenty
times, Pennsylvania seven times, Montana and Illinois five, and Nebraska and
Nevada four. 2 6 In comparison, the United States Constitution was referenced
three times. 20 7 The delegates passed Article 1, Section 4 with very little discussion .2 8 Based on this, nothing conclusive can be drawn from the history other
than the framers drew upon a variety of sources, as well as the United States
Constitution, during the drafting of Article 1, Section 4.209 For purposes of establishing an independent traffic-detention rule, this history provides no indication
that Article 1, Section 4 is derivative of the Fourth Amendment. 2'0 However,
some authorities have indicated that Wyoming Supreme Court judges early in the
Twentieth Century, some of whom served as delegates to the 1889 constitutional
21
convention, believed that the Article 1, Section 4 provided greater protections.

3. StructuralDifferences
Because the law that existed during the adoption of the Wyoming Constitution
appears to offer little that is relevant to a discussion regarding traffic detentions,
this analysis skips the fourth of the six Saldana factors and turns to the fifth:

Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484-85 (Wyo. 1999) (citing KEITER supra note 29, at
11-12) ("Although the Wyoming Declaration of Rights was passed 'without rancorous
debate,' there is evidence the framers 'endorsed the principle of liberal construction of the
Declaration of Rights."').
205 KEITER, supra note 29, at 4.
204

206

Id.

207

Id.

201

See JOURNAL

AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

OF THE STATE OF

(1889) (Cheyenne: Daily Sun, Book and Job Printing Co., 1893).
See KEITER, supra note 29, at 4.
210 See Vasquez, 990 P.2d 476, 484-85.
211 Id. at 485 (noting that this belief led the Wyoming Supreme Court to adopt the equivalent to Miranda rights fifty years before they were adopted in federal court). Delegates
to the Wyoming Constitutional Convention who also served on the Wyoming Supreme
Court around the turn of the last century included Asbury B. Conway, from September 11,
1890 to December 8, 1897; Charles N. Potter, from 1895 until 1926; Jesse Knight, from
1898 to 1905. MARIE ERWIN, 2 WYOMING BLUE BOOK 200-05 (Virginia Cole Trenholm
ed., Wyoming State Archives and Historical Department) (1974).
WYOMING

209
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structural differences between the two constitutions. 2 2 The Washington Supreme
Court-which requires an analysis of the same six factors for issues raised under its
state constitution-discerned that state constitutions and the Federal Constitution
differ in structure because the two perform different functions. 2 3 The Federal
Constitution is a "grant of power from the states," while the "state's constitution
is a limit on the state's power."21 4 These structural differences "always" suggest that
the state should offer an independent standard of its own. 215 Therefore, the structural differences indicate that a separate analysis under the state constitution is
warranted, but they provide no indication as to whether the protections provided
under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution should be greater, lesser,
or equal to those under the Fourth Amendment.

4. Issues of Local and State Concern
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressed an issue of local and state concern
in O'Boyle v. State that, according to the court, differentiates Wyoming and creates
216
a need for a search-and-seizure standard for traffic stops unique to the state.
The court observed that the state's strategic location makes it a conduit for drugs
headed to other areas of the country.2 17 In response, a state and national lawenforcement effort has subjected travelers on the state's highways to aggressive
drug interdiction tactics that impact the innocent and the guilty, and according
to the court, Wyoming citizens have had rights impinged upon for the benefit of
212 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The fourth Saldana factor is "pre-existing

state law." See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
213 State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 596 (Wash. 1994).
214 Id. (citing State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 663 (Wash. 1991) ("[T]he United States
Constitution is a grant of limited power authorizing the federal government to exercise
only those constitutionally enumerated powers, whereas the state constitution imposes
limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the state.")).
215

Id.

216

O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 411 (Wyo. 2005).

217

Id. The court stated,
The State of Wyoming is bisected north and south and east and west
by two major interstate highways. Interstate 80 provides drug traffickers with easy west to east access across the United States and is
a well-known route for transporting drugs. The annual average daily
traffic on 1-80 near Cheyenne, where Mr. O'Boyle was stopped, is
over 20,000 vehicles. Wyoming citizens operate a significant number
of these vehicles. Traffic stops along 1-80 are a routine part of the
national drug interdiction program. Although precise figures detailing
the number of searches conducted pursuant to consent are not-and
probably can never be-available, there is no dispute that these type
of searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of
people every year.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
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people living in other areas. 18 The court objected to stops initiated as pretexts
to searches for drugs and their "resulting intrusion upon the privacy rights of
Wyoming citizens," and it criticized troopers who routinely ask travelers aggressive
questions about travel plans without articulable reasons to suspect the travelers
219
carried contraband.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's observations gave no recognition to a
countervailing problem that can also be expressed as an issue of state and local
concern-not all drugs on Wyoming's highways are headed elsewhere. 2 Some
drugs are consumed in Wyoming communities, as evidenced by the increasing
number of drug cases in Wyoming courts. 221 Therefore, drug interdiction is not
just a national concern, and if Wyoming's traffic detention doctrine is to have
any legitimacy, it must articulate how drug interdiction is to be pursued without
222
violating people's rights.
218

Id. The court stated,
Our location along a nationally recognized drug trafficking corridor
likely results in a disproportionately large percentage of Wyoming's
comparatively small population being subjected to what have become
routine requests to relinquish their privacy rights by detention, invasive
questioning and searches-all without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity other than the offense giving rise to the stop.

Id. The court provided no evidence that drug interdiction has unfairly impacted Wyoming
citizens other than its expression that victimization was "likely." See id.
219
Id. ("We previously have expressed disapproval of the use of traffic violations as a pretext
to conduct narcotics investigations.") (citing Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo.

2003)).
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Nat'l Drug Intelligence Cntr., Wyoming DrugThreat Assessment,
Prod. No. 2002-SO389WY-001 December 2001, at 8, available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/ndic/pubs07/712/712p.pdf (last visited November 26, 2006). The Department of
Justice describes Wyoming as "both a destination and a transit area" for methamphetamine. Id. at 15. The primary method of transportation through Wyoming is by private
vehicle using interstate highway. Id.
221Id. at 9. Between 1999 and 2000, twenty-three sheriff's departments and forty-three
police departments in Wyoming reported the following increases in drug arrests: arrests
of female juveniles increased from 106 to 122; arrests of adult females from 254 to 301;
arrests of adult males from 1381 to 1479; but arrests of juvenile males decreased from 448
to 362. Id. Categories increased in related areas; for example, arrests of adult males for
manufacturing and sale of illicit drugs increased from 173 to 195. Id.
222
See O'Boyle, 117 P3d at 422 (Voigt, J. concurring). Justice Voigt chided courts in
general for being intellectually dishonest, stating that in many cases traffic stops are really
attempts to interdict drugs, and if treated as such, the discussion would be less "phony":
"[t]he real question should be, given the major drug problem facing this country and the
huge amount of drugs being transported on our nation's highways, what investigatory
steps directed at drug interdiction are constitutionally reasonable in a traffic stop situation." Id. However, Justice Voigt gave no indication as to what those "reasonable" drug
interdiction steps might include. Id.
220
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In summary, the relevant Sa/dana factors show that a method for independently analyzing traffic detentions under the Wyoming Constitution is warranted.
However, only two of the factors indicate that the protections provided under the
Wyoming Constitution might be greater than those provided under the Fourth
Amendment, and both these indications appear suspect upon closer examination.
For example, a look at the third factor-Wyoming's constitutional history-reveals
that Wyoming Supreme Court justices early in the last century believed that the
Wyoming Constitution provided greater Bill of Rights-type protections than the
United States Constitution; therefore, those early courts required that suspects be
given warnings similar to those now demanded by Miranda.22 3 But in the 1960s,
the Warren Court greatly expanded Fourth Amendment protections, so no one
can know whether those same justices, if they were available for consultation
today, would believe that protections provided by Article 1, Section 4 continue
to be greater.22 4 Regarding the sixth Saldana factor-state and local concern-the
Wyoming Supreme Court has held that nationwide drug interdiction has unfairly
impacted Wyoming citizens, necessitating a traffic-detention rule that grants additional protections to travelers detained by authorities.22 5 The Wyoming Supreme
Court's reasoning, however, offers no evidence that Wyoming citizens are impacted
any more than citizens of other states, and the court ignores a countervailing state
and local concern-Wyoming's very serious drug problem, which creates a strong
governmental interest in drug interdiction.22 6 Given this, the analysis of the six
factors provides no clear indications as to whether protections under Article 1,
Section 4 should be greater or lesser than the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the
court must discern the reasonableness of individual traffic detentions using factors
identified in the state's cases.

B. Recommended Traffic Detention Rule
The Wyoming Supreme Court remains the true arbiter of the state's constitution, and the court has considerable discretion regarding how Article 1, Section 4
should be interpreted. For this reason, it seems unwise to make specific predictions
regarding what the court might do. Therefore, this analysis avoids specific recommendations and instead looks to define what is consistent with Wyoming law as
it currently stands, considering the six factors the court indicated were relevant
in Saldana.22 7 This comment also notes that Wyoming case law continues to hold

See supra note 211 and accompanying text (referring to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)).
224 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
223
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that the Fourth Amendment is persuasive with regard to Article 1, Section 4, and
conceivably, the court could do as other state courts have done and incorporate
portions of federal law into Wyoming's traffic-detention rule.228
Most of the factors mentioned in this analysis have not been recognized by the
Wyoming Supreme Court since it announced in Vasquez v. State its intention to
consider search-and-seizure cases under the Wyoming Constitution.2 29 Therefore,
this analysis assumes that though the pre-Mapp cases appear to be good law, their
precedential value remains questionable until their holdings are recognized by the
current court.23 °
A typical traffic detention occurs when an officer pulls over a traveler for a
minor traffic offense. The detention lasts from the moment of the stop until the
2 31
officer returns the traveler's documents and says that the traveler is free to go.
Until the documents are returned, the traveler cannot leave, and therefore, is in
the officer's custody.2 32 According to Wyoming cases, the following factors are
relevant to determining the reasonableness of the stop:
The reasonableness of the initial stop and the continued reasonableness
of the officer's actions. In Wyoming a traffic detention must be consistent with
2 33
the state's general search-and-seizure standard as articulated in State v. Peterson.
That standard holds that "only unreasonable searches are forbidden, and whether
or not a search is reasonable is a question of law to be decided from all the circumstances of a case.'234 Hence, Wyoming cases indicate that the officer's actions
must be reasonable in their entirety, and that any information that comes to light
because of an officer's unreasonableness cannot be used as evidence.2 35 The cases

also indicate that an investigation must be initiated in "good faith.

228

236 The

require-

Saldana v. State, 846 P2d 604, 611 (Wyo. 1993) ("Even though the federal law

establishes minimum requirements for individual protection and does not mandate any
maximum criteria as to the degree of protection afforded an individual under state law,
federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are regarded as persuasive .
).
229 See supra notes 132-37.
230 See supra notes 132-37.
231See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
233 State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342, 345 (Wyo. 1920); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489
(Wyo. 1999); O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 409-10 (Wyo. 2005).
234 O'Boyle, 117 P.3d at 409-10.
235 State v. Munger, 4 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Wyo. 1931). See supra notes 120-27.
236 State v. Young, 281 P. 17, 19 (Wyo. 1929) (quoting State ex rel. Hansen v. District
Court, 233 P. 126, 129 (Mont. 1925)).
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ment that the officer act in good-faith appears to be a higher standard than the
Fourth Amendment provides in that the requirement seems to weigh the officer's
237
intentions, which under the Fourth Amendment is not considered material.
Although how much higher remains unclear.2 38 In any event, the officer must
have a valid reason for initiating the traffic stop, and all of the officer's actions
23 9
must be reasonable in the light of the circumstances.
Whether the suspect was compelled to produce evidence. The close connection between Section 4 and Section 11 of Article 1 means the court is likely
to discourage any action by authorities that appears to compel self-incrimination,
which Wyoming law interprets very broadly. 240 For example, Wyoming's definition of self-incrimination includes the unreasonable seizure of personal property
from a suspect's possession for use as evidence.2 11 Consequently, Wyoming's case
law requires close scrutiny of any questioning by the officer about travel plans,
242
as well as a close examination of efforts to obtain consent to search a vehicle.
Any seizure of personal property from a vehicle for use as evidence would seem
to risk violating the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, unless the
243
property is contraband or the fruit of a crime.

See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (noting that an officer's state
of mind cannot invalidate "an action taken [by an officer] as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify that action").
238 See O'Boyle, 117 P3d at 411 (citing Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700 (Wyo. 2003) ("In
Damato, we joined in another state court's expression of concern about sanctioning conduct 'where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of
criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest
the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with
impunity."')). Based upon the reasoning of Damato, an officer's intentions must figure
237

into the analysis somehow; however, the Wyoming Supreme Court held in Fertig that a

reasonable traffic stop cannot be made unreasonable because an officer's intentions were
to investigate another matter. Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, 1 27 (noting that efforts to
enforce traffic laws are objectively reasonable because they are based on violations of the
law). For an analysis of the stop in Fertig using Wyoming case law, see supra note 190.

The provision that the officer act in good faith would certainly prohibit the officer from
misleading a defendant, and thereby obtaining evidence, because that would compel the
defendant to provide self-incriminating evidence. Wiggin v. State, 206 P. 373, 377-78
(Wyo. 1922) ("A search pursuant to an admission gained unlawfully by stealth, force or
coercion is illegal ....).
239 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 68-102 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the related Fourth
Amendment doctrine, see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
242
O'Boyle, 117 P.3d at 411-15.
243 See supra notes 68-102.
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However, the cases are not so restrictive as to deny officers of all avenues of
investigation.2 44 For example, the cases allow officers to ask about contraband,
provided that the questioning is not coercive. 245 Also, the protections of personal
property do not appear to extend to property that is stolen, contraband or otherwise illegal. 246 And an officer who reasonably believes a felony is in progress
can arrest the suspect without a warrant. 24 7 Therefore, during a traffic detention,
an officer who has sufficient evidence can make arrests and confiscate evidence,
provided that the officer's actions are reasonable.
Sufficiency of the evidence. Once in contact with a suspect, an officer can act
on information indicating a crime is underway provided that the officer's actions
are "in good faith," and the evidence is such that "a reasonable man, acting in
good faith, [would] believe that a crime was being committed in his presence. "248

244

Wiggin v. State, 206 P. 373, 376 (Wyo. 1922) ("The law is well settled that an officer

has the right to search the party arrested and take from his person and from his possession
property reasonably believed to be connected with the crime, and the fruits, means or evidences thereof, and he may take and hold them to be disposed of as the court directs.").
245 Id. at 378. In dicta, the court stated that an officer should be able to ask a defendant
in custody about stolen property that the officer reasonably believed to be in the suspect's
possession, provided the questioning was not coercive. Id. But see id. at 377-78 ("A search
made pursuant to an admission gained unlawfully by stealth, force or coercion is illegal,
and it has been held that coercion is implied when the officer displays his badge or shows
an illegal warrant and thus obtains the acquiescence for admission.") and Maki v. State,
112 P. 334, 336 (Wyo. 1911) ("The person so under arrest and charged ... and who
is without counsel is entitled to be informed of his right to decline to be a witness, or
to answer any question and properly cautioned as essential elements in determining the
voluntary character of his statements then and there made.").
246
See State v. George, 231 P. 683, 689 (Wyo. 1924) (holding that an officer may confiscate
contraband upon the arrest of the suspect).
247 Id.at 690 ("Where a felony has been committed.... a peace officer may arrest without
a warrant, one whom he has reasonable or probable grounds to suspect of having committed the felony."). The case law is more limited regarding the arrest of misdemeanors,
for which the power to arrest without a warrant is limited to instances where the offense

occurred in the presence of an officer. Id. at 689-90.
248 State v. Young, 281 P. 17, 19 (Wyo. 1929) (quoting State ex rel. Hansen v. District

Court, 233 P. 126, 129 (Mont. 1925)). The language of Hansen, quoted in Young, suggests
an objective test based upon a hypothetical reasonable observer. Id. ("[W]ere those facts
and circumstances such as to cause a reasonableman, acting in good faith, to believe that
a crime was being committed in his presence?") (emphasis added). Noting that the test
evokes the reasonableman, rather than the reasonableofficer, the Wyoming Supreme Court
may need to resolve what role officer training plays in the application of this test, considering that a reasonable man, lacking a reasonable officer's training and experience, might
reach a different conclusion when confronted with identical information. See 4 LAFAVE,
supra note 3, § 9.5(e)-(f) (indicating that in some circumstances the Fourth Amendment
allows investigative detentions when officer training indicates that the suspect fits a drug
profile or when a suspect acts suspiciously).
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To gather this evidence, all of the officer's senses can come into play, including
the sense of smell. 249 As an officer reasonably acquires incriminating information,
the investigation can expand. 25" For example, an officer acted reasonably when
he approached a car after noticing it was parked in an unusual manner, who
then smelled whiskey through a window, looked-first through the window, then
through an open door-and saw a jug of whiskey, and then examined the jug and
seized it.2 5 ' Given this, an officer involved in a traffic detention who observes an
odor or something to cause him to reasonably believe a crime is underway, can act
on those beliefs.
Naturally, the factors mentioned in this comment create a mere skeleton of a
complete traffic-detention rule and should be developed with additional research
and future court decisions. Also, nothing prevents the court from incorporating
portions of the federal traffic-detention doctrine into Wyoming law, as other
courts have done, or from redefining terms already in existence within state law.
If, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court chooses to incorporate federal doctrine,
it should do so expressly, and clearly describe how the amended doctrine is to be
applied, thereby ensuring that it meets its goal of creating a "principled" traffic252
detention doctrine based on Wyoming legal concepts.
IV. CONCLUSION

The current traffic detention doctrine under the Wyoming Constitution
as articulated in O'Boyle is insufficient. It provides no practical guidance to
law enforcement, an insufficient explanation of the factors that the court finds
relevant, and no basis for predicting future court decisions. Therefore, the state
rule is a poor substitute for the federal traffic-detention rule under Terry v. Ohio,
which gives not only ample guidance to law enforcement, but a basis for predicting future court decisions. Furthermore, the concepts employed by the court to
explain the unreasonableness of certain actions by the officer in O'Boyle cannot
be understood without referring to federal case law. Therefore, that portion of
the O'Boyle decision fails to meet the Wyoming Supreme Court's stated goal of
creating a "principled" basis for decisions based upon the state constitution. This

249

Young, 281 P at 19 (quoting State v. Loftis, 292 S.W 29 (Mo. 1927) (noting that it

was reasonable for an officer to discover whiskey kegs by looking into a vehicle after being
attracted by the odor of whiskey)).
250 See id.
251 See id. at 20 (citing State v. Connor, 300 S.W. 685) (Mo. 1927) ("Under such circumstances, no search warrant was necessary, because the deputy sheriff had before him ample
facts and information upon which to base, not only a conclusion of probable cause, but a
well-founded belief that the car contained contraband goods and that a felony had been
committed.").
252
Saldana v. State, 846 P2d 604, 623 (Golden, J., concurring).
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insufficient traffic-detention rule is inconsistent with Wyoming case law and
the Wyoming Constitution, which contains ample basis for a sufficient trafficdetention rule. The Wyoming Supreme Court should pursue its stated goal and
create a principled traffic-detention rule based upon Wyoming law.
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